## EXECUTIVE SESSION

## JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

Meeting No. 87-1-4 - Monday, February 20, 1961

Congress of the United States

Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in the Committee Room, the Capitol,

Honorable Clinton P. Anderson (Chairman) presiding.

Present were: Senators Clinton P. Anderson (presiding),

John O. Pastore, Albert Gore, Bourke B. Hickenlooper and

Wallace Bennett; Representatives Chet Holifield, Melvin Price,

Wayne Aspinall, Thomas Morris, James E. Van Zandt, Craig Hosmer,

William Bates and Jack Westland.

Committee staff present: James T. Ramey, Executive

Director, John T. Conway, George Murphy, Jr., and Carey Brewer.

CHAIRMAN ANDERSON. The meeting will be in order.

The purpose of this meeting is to elect officers, to discuss the NATO nuclear weapons report, and any other business.

First of all, I would like to introduce our new member,

Congressman Tom Morris of New Mexico. Tom, we are glad to
have you aboard.

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couldn't we take up that Italian agreement in Executive Session and have the State Department up here to make their presentation on this matter -

SENATOR PASTORE. When?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Tomorrow.

SENATOR PASTORE. It is all right with me.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I think we should as long as the time has run as far as it has. We ought to move.

One of the reasons some of us were anxious it should not come up and were hoping it could be held on the President's desk is that we might prevail upon him to re-open the negotiations with the we Italian Government. Some of us saw some things when were over in Italy that convinced us there should not be this type of agreement. However, we are presented with a fait accompli. The agreement has been signed by the negotiators for both nations. It has come from the President's desk here and has been referred to this Committee. The time apparently is considered to be running.

We are in a very embarrassing position to oppose an international agreement at this time and yet some of us feel pretty strongly that Italy is not in a position to be cleared from the standpoint of security, stability and certain other factors which

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I won't go into now. Therefore we are going to be faced with the problem of whether or not for the sake of international comity we should approve this agreement or turn it down or whether we ask that it be remanded to the President for further consideration. In other words we are going to be faced with having to make a decision. I don't want to make that decision until we have the presentation of the State Department.

SENATOR PASTORE. The thing that bothers me, Chet, and I would like to get your view is that this agreement is nothing more than a perfunctory act being performed by us because these missiles are in these countries, not by any bilateral agreement which comes before the Congress, but by some Executive military agreement and it is a fait accompli. I don't see what we are going to change whether we approve this agreement or not. You certainly do not pull the Jupiters out of Italy. All our agreement does is to authorize information for training purposes, but it has nothing at all to do with the establishment of these Jupiters or any other missile on a NATO country.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. What about our control of the warheads?

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SENATOR PASTORE. The control of the warheads under the basic law would have to be with the Americans. It has nothing to do with this bilateral. This bilateral doesn't touch that, does it?

MR. RAMEY. Not as such. Maybe it ought to.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. The fact is that certain proceedings have occurred in Italy which some of us believe to be in contradiction to the law. We think such proceedings, which have already occurred in Italy, should have been undertaken only under this kind of a bilateral agreement. We are presented again with a fait accompli. Do we recognize the validity of the situation in Italy by condoning it or if we sincerely believe it is wrong, do we point out that the action which has been taken in Italy should not have been taken until a bilateral was signed?

SENATOR PASTORE. I agree.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. These are the sort of things we will bring out in the hearings.

SENATOR PASTORE. Chet, even after you have done it, those missiles are there. That is the harm of the whole thing.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. The bilateral goes further than putting the missiles there. The bilateral goes to the point of revealing certain classified information to the Italian operators. They claim they haven't done this as yet. The bilateral will

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give them ostensibly the authority to do some things they claim they haven't done.

SENATOR PASTORE. May I make a suggestion, Mr. Chairman? Apart from the bilateral which could be something that is incidental or co-incidental, I think myself what we have to do here is to call up the responsible people in the Administration to find out whether they approve or disapprove of what has been done with reference to Jupiter and what are the policies and plans of our Government with relation to that. We can be very critical but we don't change anything.

The important thing here is they ought to get permission to train other nationals before they install these. You see they have got the cart before the horse. They put the things in and then they ask for permission from us to teach the nationals how to use them.

Whether or not they get that permission, the missile is there.

They should get permission so as to know how to use them before they put them in. I think we ought to have a complete understanding on that.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I am in complete accord with you.

That is exactly what this report brings out.

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MR. RAMEY. There is some question on the use of the bombs on aircraft such as we saw. John, are they going to use that aircraft in Italy?

MR. CONWAY. Yes.

MR. RAMEY. So they would need Restricted Data for that purpose.

MR. CONWAY. Of all the weapons systems in which we are cooperating with them -- and that includes the Honest John in which they are already training and in which they have said they do not need Restricted Data -- the only area in which they do need Restricted Data they claim is the F-84 Mark 7 weapons system for the last two weeks of training pilots. They will have to pass Restricted Data to the pilots. It is for that purpose and that purpose only we have been informed and that is one system that would be affected if the agreement is not going through.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Those are the present plans, but if the agreement goes through they can have many other things.

MR. CONWAY. Right.

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CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. There is an implication of a much wider field of knowledge. That is the point. Do we feel Italy is secure enough from the standpoint of sabotage and Communist infiltration and so forth that we do want to grant a bilateral here which will open the door to a much wider scope of impartation of information than the particular point John has mentioned. Once it is open, it is open to a great body of security data which can be transmitted. I think that is one of the things we have got to decide in our consideration of the Italian agreement.

SENATOR PASTORE. Whom do you expect to have up here?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. The State Department of course negotiated it. We must have the successors to whoever did negotiate it come up here and present to the Committee the facts relating to their negotiations as they have done in the past on these bilateral agreements. You have handled that Subcommittee on the bilateral agreements in the past. We can handle it in any way. We haven't got the subcommittees set up yet. I think perhaps we should handle this particular one in the full Committee because of the shortage of time.

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SENATOR PASTORE. I was going to suggest you bring up

Secretary McNamarra and Dean Risk and not go to the second

or third echelons. This is something where you have to get fast

answers. I think you have to consolidate and crystallize your

policy here and if anybody less than McNammara and Rusk come up,

you are just wasting your time. You will get a lot of double talk.

SENATOR ANDERSON. Are you going to have somebody up to tell us how many of the Nautilus secrets got to the Russians?

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. When I read that in the papers, I recalled our conversation.

SENATOR ANDERSON. If there ever was a time in the world that we were right, we certainly were on that.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, this report is a very important report, I think. It is marked Top Secret and I assume it is. I would like to read it. What is the policy? I don't want to take it to my office if it is not supposed to be.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Let's take this up right now.

SENATOR ANDERSON. You have to come here and read it.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, could we have a staff member bring this to our office and stay there while we read it?

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REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Whatever it is, it is in effect.

SENATOR GORE. I have read it while you fellows have
been talking.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. I hope you approve.

SENATOR GORE. It is a very provocative report.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Could I just have a few minutes to talk about this report?

SENATOR ANDERSON. Just one second before you do. Is there any reason why we can't do as we have done on many things —get enough declassification to our report so that a man can take it to his office and read it.

SENATOR GORE. It is not possible with this.

MR. RAMEY. In time we may be able to declassify part of it.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I do this for the benefit of those members who were not on the Ad Hoc Committee.

I might start by saying Congressman Aspinall and I were on the Committee and Congressman Westland and Hosmer and Senator Bennett. The Republicans had us Democrats outnumbered on this trip but we had no trouble with them. We got along just fine.

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SENATOR ANDERSON. You are about even.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. That is why it is such a good report.

(Laughter)

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We think we have a very important report here and it was unanimous on the part of the Ad Hoc Committee. There is a letter of transmittal here. Incidentally we sent this report on to the President because we weren't organized and time was running so fast that we were afraid that Norstad and others might convey to the President a view on the subject which was contrary to ours. So I secured permission of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee to get this immediately to the President.

It was delivered on the morning he made the trip to Germantown.

I happen to know because while he was getting a briefing at the

Commission it was brought up. Incidentally John Graham and

John McCone also were on this trip with us. John Graham and his

staff and Mr. McCone's people sat in on the drawing up of the

report with our staff members.


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So it was mentioned at this meeting and Pierre Salinger spoke up and said. "Mr. President, this report was delivered to me just before we left. I didn't have time to put it in the security vault so I have it right in my brief case. I will hand it to you as we get on the plane."

So it was handed to him. He did scan it. I don't know how much he read. He had this report in his hand on the trip back from Germantown to the White House. I don't know how much of it he read, of course. I thought it was important to get it to him.

I also transmitted a copy to Secretary of Defense McNammara and two to the State Department. We had two copies prepared to deliver to Dean Acheson and Finletter because they have been appointed to the Special NATO Advisory Committee to the President. We found out they hadn't been cleared as yet so we haven't delivered them.

Jim has just told me that they were delivered today. We couldn't deliver them before because they hadn't received their clearance.



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The Atomic Energy Commission of course has a copy.

Commissioner Graham has a copy which was delivered to him.

That is all the distribution that has been made. I thought it was important to get it to them now because policy is being made in this field. We were anxious that our views be at least known to them before definite policy was established.

SENATOR GORE. Was this delivered to Secretary Acheson?

MR. RAMEY. This was delivered to the State Department.

SENATOR ANDERSON. Pierre Salinger can put it in
his brief case, but Senator Hickenlooper can't take one to his
office.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. There are certain regulations with regard to the receipt of documents. John can explain what they are better than I can. John, will you do so?

MR. CONWAY. In this case we checked through the AEC to verify that the individuals to whom the letters or reports were addressed had a Q clearance. Secondly we determined the name of the individual in the State Department who normally receipted for classified information that was transmitted to the State Department and verified through the AEC that this individual also had a Q clearance. Having verified that the individual who

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SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. Top Secret?

MR. CONWAY. It is a violation.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. In an envelope and delivered to me by a representative of the Department of Defense.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. So have I.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. I have read the stuff, called up this Committee for someone to come over and get it.

I didn't want to keep it.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. The Department of Defense has a looser arrangement than the AEC. They have much looser arrangements in the handling of classified information.

SENATOR GORE. One thing that particularly hit me with respect to security in this report is that non-Americans with non-American vehicles are transporting nuclear weapons from place to place in foreign countries.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We found out that these are all obsolete weapons. That is the only thing I can say.

SENATOR GORE. This is a ready invitation to certain countries who might like very much to have even our designs of obsolete weapons; China among them.

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REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make this statement. I think this is a real hot potato. If it is followed by the Executive Branch, it would mean quite a change in policy insofar as nuclear weapons are concerned in the NATO nations. Before any member, who hasn't read it, commit themselves I would certainly recommend that they read it because they may not agree.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I hope every member will read this.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. What do you mean by "may not agree"?

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. I don't know. It is pretty factual. It makes some pretty definite statements as to what should be done. It is the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee and it might be you would disagree with some parts of it.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. I would certainly be prepared to accept, without waiting, the findings of this group as to the facts.

But maybe on policy recommendations -

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. There are some definite policy recommendations in it.

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REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Are we going to have hearings on this? Have you schedule a hearing, Chet?

MR. RAMEY. This is supposed to be the first discussion today.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I had it here on my list and then we got off on this security discussion.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. What about having a staff member read the report?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. If you want to take the time we can go through our recommendations and read them for all of you now and then those of you who want to do so could come here to read it or have it taken to their office.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. That is basically what generated my original question here. I don't know whether you would be putting the chicken or egg first. My original thought was that I would like to read it before we had a discussion. I am perfectly willing to stay here and sit in this room.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I want you to know that in the third paragraph of my letter to the President, I said

"Due to the fact that the formal organization of the Joint

Committee on Atomic Energy will not occur for several days, I

am presenting this study informally with the unanimous endorsement

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of the five members of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee. I have no reason to believe that it will not receive the overwhelming support of the full membership of the Joint Committee."

I did not bind the Committee to this. I didn't say it was a Committee responsibility. It is just an Ad Hoc Subcommittee. I am willing of course to entertain any method of consideration of this.

I think you will find the recommendations begin on page 42. If you would like to have Joh read those, we can go through them now. I would appreciate it if the Committee would take the time to go through them with us.

SENATOR ANDERSON. How will you know what the recommendation means if you haven't read the 40 pages that preceded
them?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I think you all have enough general knowledge to pretty well understand it, but the specific confirming data is a matter of going through all the rest of the pages.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. I have talked to two or three of the members who were on this trip. From what they have told me, I think without doubt I am pretty much in agreement. However.

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I think I would agree with Clint's question, "How are you going to know whether the recommendations are valid as far as your own acceptance is concerned if you haven't read the preliminary premise on which the recommendations are based?" I don't say this with any thought of disagreeing necessarily with the thing.

SENATOR BENNETT. Do our 202 Hearings begin tomorrow morning?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Yes, and we have to go through with them because we have a list of witnesses arranged and we can't simply dismiss them. It is tomorrow, Wednesday and Friday. On Thursday I think we have just one hearing, do we not, Jim?

MR. RAMEY. 202's in the afternoon, but Dr. Seaborg's confirmation -

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Dr. Seaborg's confirmation is Thursday morning. Friday, I believe is open.

MR. RAMEY. Friday morning we have 202's.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We have part of Wednesday for some additional work on this Italian bilateral and we have Friday afternoon of this week that we can work on it.

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SENATOR ANDERSON. I think we ought to count out Wednesday (Lincoln's Birthday). I am sure many people have already made plans for the day.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Now is the time to speak up.

SENATOR PASTORE. I repeat again -- and I may be wrong and it has become a fixation with me -- that I agree with everything you have said but we have a hearing on a bilateral tomorrow and we are talking about a horse of a different color. There is nothing in this report that repudiates the Italian bilateral. What you are talking about here is further proliferation of weapons. That has been done by Executive Order. The point is if the Defense Department persists in doing this, what difference will a bilateral make?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. You are relating it to the bilateral. I am relating it to the whole concept of Norstad and NATO which goes far beyond a bilateral with the Italians.

SENATOR PASTORE. I think we ought to have the top boys up to talk about the assignment of atomic weapons -

SENATOR BENNETT. Do you want to read the report before?

SENATOR PASTORE. That is right.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We can do that tomorrow. We

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SENATOR BENNETT. Speaking as one who was a member of the Subcommittee and therefore doesn't have to read the report again, could we set aside an hour and come back tonight or could we meet ahead of the 202's tomorrow?

SENATOR ANDERSON. Let's set the time for Dr. Seaborg as nearly to 10:00 as possible on Thursday. The House members are always invited to attend a Senate Confirmation hearing. Let us have our hearing on Seaborg, which I do not anticipate will last more than 1.5 or 20 minutes and then at 10:30 start to take up this matter. That will give us a chance to read it.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. That is all right with me.

SENATOR BENNETT. Can't we push Seaborgup to 9:30?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We are under no compulsion as to time. We have already delivered this to the people who are making policy. We want the Committee to understand it and to support it if they feel they can.

The real compulsion we are under is with respect to this Italian agreement which I would consider completely separate from this although it does contains things that pertain to it. But let's not mix the two up.

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SENATOR BENNETT. Why not move Seaborg up to 9:30 a.m.?

SENATOR ANDERSON. We have announced a public hearing at a certain hour.

SENATOR BENNETT. I have had hearings which were changed within eight hours of hearing time. We have 48 hours.

SENATOR PASTORE. Why don't we simply take these recommendations now and have you give us a thumbnail explanation of each one without asking too many questions. Then when reading it by yourself, you can better understand it.

REPRESENTATIVE BATES. What else do we have before us?

SENATOR PASTORE. That would prepare us now as we read it. We will receive an explanation of it. It won't be a waste of time. I would appreciate it. If you would just take it section for section -- just the recommendations and then we would read the background and everything else we wanted to more carefully later. I think you ought to give us an idea of what this report contains.

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SENATOR GORE. Having read it, I think you will find it far more fruitful to read the analysis and then the recommendations.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, I have an alternative proposal that we set the time, as Senator Anderson has mentioned, say at 10:00 or 11:00 o'clock on the day the Senate Section meets on the Seabog confirmation and between now and then those of us who have not read the report accept the responsibility of reading it and being prepared to discuss it after that meeting.

SENATOR ANDERSON. I think you have to give us some chance to read it. I, for instance, have another 60 or 70 page report on sugar which I have to read before we get any further into the Sugar Act. I took another 160 pages of typewritten material home with me over the weekend. One just can't get it all read.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I think we might do this if it is all right with you. Turn to page 60. There are 2-1/2 pages there which is a summary of the philosophy of the report without getting into the individual recommendations. If John will read those two pages then I think you will get the flavor. If there any questions you can ask them of me, the staff or any member of the

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Ad Hoc Committee at that time.

SENATOR GORE. What page?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Page 60.

SENATOR BENNETT. Right after the asterisks.

MR. CONWAY. "There are many additional pros and cons to the various arrangements discussed. Which arrangements might be best may vary with the time. It would appear, however, that the present arrangement under which a fictional concept of sole possession and custody by the U.S. exists in 'alert procedures' is not necessarily the best for the United States, for the individual nations, or for NATO.

"It might be better to consider different arrangements with different countries, depending upon geography, the political stability, the current state of technical advancement, and military stature of each nation. It might be also bætter to consider different arrangements for different weapon systems.

"This report, of course, is based on the observations made during the trip to NATO installations and other military installations November 26- December 15, 1960, and supplementary arrangements for different weapon systems.

This report, of course, is based on the observations made during the trip to NATO installations and other military installations November 26- December 15, 1960, and supplementary information

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provided by Government agencies.

"We have attempted to identify and clarify the various facets of the NATO program which have come under our observation. In some instances we have pointed out problems both of a general and particular nature which have caused us concern. In each category we have tried to make responsible recommendations, some of which may require legislative action by this Committee and the Congress.

"The problems we have identified, and the alternatives and recommendations we have made, all add up to the conclusion that it is desirable to re-evalute the existing U.S.-NATO nuclear weapon program and all proposals for its modification.

'The Committee' study of the various phases of nuclear weapons use in NATO causes us to conclude that these specific problems cannot be solved without consideration of their relationship to the basic structure of NATO including the control of its military capability. We realize that the scope of the whole NATO problem goes beyond the immediate legislative jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, but the nuclear phase of the NATO problem cannot be solved separately. It must be considered concurrently and with relation to NATO's:

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- "(1) current and future mission;
- (2) organizational and administrative structure;
- (3) military sophistication and ability of each member nation:
- (4) national attitude toward cooperation (through NATO);
- (5) political stability of each nation;
- (6) security (risk of sabotage and disclosure of Restricted Data);
- (7) accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
- (8) appropriateness of weapons assigned;
- (9) vulnerability of fixed bases compared to new concepts of mobility and evasiveness.

"Therefore, we believe it to be our duty to call the attention of those in the Executive Department not only the nuclear phase of the NATO problem, which is a subject of specific jurisdictional interest, but also its relation to the over-all problems in the NATO framework."

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. That is the general philosophy.

I might mention this morning in the Washington Post there was a new item, a copy of which has been passed out to you, which reads: 'NATO PARTNERS SEEK BROAD POLICY REVIEW."

This is quite interesting if you know what is in our report because this, in effect, shows that far from these NATO nations begging

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for these nuclear arms, that it is our idea to force nuclear arms upon them whether they are qualified to receive them or not. There is not only a real reluctance but an opposition -- and it is a growing opposition -- in some of these countries to having these weapons there. I am thinking of Italy and Greece.

They didn't even want this Committee to go down and see the bases and see our installment of weapons which they had put there without agreement. When we queried, Why?, they said "We don't want any reaction from the population."

SENATOR GORE. What country?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Italy and Greece. They refused to let Senator Pastore go down.

SENATOR PASTORE. The Ambassador suggested and recommended strongly that I not go and I didn't go.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. They did the same with us, but we insisted on going.

SENATOR PASTORE. They had threatened to conduct a demonstration there several days prior. It wasn't connected with me but for some reason these people in that part of the nation—the Communists were demonstrating against these weapons.

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SENATOR BENNETT. They have been demonstrating against nuclear weapons in Britain -- in that peace march.

SENATOR ANDERSON. This is a function of this Committee.

Until we know clearly what the United States expects from NATO,
what it should give to NATO, what the proper contributions are
for participating, I definitely believe that the further proliferation
of assignment of nuclear weapons to NATO should be held in
abeyance.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Yes, because nuclear weapons are involved and we have jurisdictional responsibility for the safety and custody.

SENATOR ANDERSON. That isn't admitted by the

White House, is it? Eisenhower took the position he was Commanderin-Chief and would send nuclear weapons where he thought they
should go. He said that this Committee had no jurisdiction.

You are not going to expect any succeeding President is going to
reduce the authoritative area that Eisenhower marked out for
himself.

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CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. It is entirely possible and neither am I going to abdicate the responsibility which the law places upon this Committee.

SENATOR ANDERSON. To decide how many nuclear weapons should be sent to each country?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Not necessarily, but with respect to the custody and control of these weapons the law plainly says they should be in the possession of the United States and these weapons are not in the possession of the United States.

The military has coined a new word called "custody" which -

SENATOR ANDERSON. I am wondering what we have to do with the proliferation and assignment -


CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Because proliferation is in violation of the "possession" section of the Atomic Energy Act.

SENATOR ANDERSON. Not proliferation -

SENATOR EXENNETT. Under the present circumstances -

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Under the present circumstances.

However, we specifically expressed the fact that this goes beyond



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the Committee jurisdiction -

SENATOR ANDERSON. If it does, why don't we stay out of it?

SENATOR PASTORE. It involves something, Clint.


I don't go all the way with Chet, but he has a point.

They are coming up here with these bilateral agreements which gives authority to impart certain information and training to other nationals to use these weapons. That is why they are there.

These weapons being there would mean nothing to them unless they know how to use them. So we are tied in with it in a way.

If these weapons were there exclusively under American control, to be used by Americans and not by anybody else, we wouldn't have a problem. The President would have the right to do whatever he wants. The minute the President puts these in a position whereby other national are going to begin to use these weapons and understand how these weapons are to be used, and it comes up here, then you have got to tie it all up in one package. You can't separate one from the other. It is tied in there.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. I think maybe you all three have points. There are points in here which I for one would doubt if this Committee has jurisdiction over, but the proliferation of



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information with regard to atomic energy -


CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Exactly.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. That is clearly within the jurisdiction of this Committee and I think the exclusive jurisidiction of this Committee. I am speaking of the proliferation of information with regard to atomic energy and not weapons. I want to make that clear. Once the atomic energy of this is converted into a weapon with the consent of Congress or otherwise where atomic energy is authorized to go, probably it moves out of our jurisdiction insofar as utility, strategy, location and such things are concerned from a technical standpoint. Then it goes to a Military Affairs Committee or something like that.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Providing concurrently the proliferation of information does not go along with that; but that is exactly what happened.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. Wait a minute, Chet. Assuming the question of the proliferation of atomic energy information has already been settled -

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. But it hasn't.




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SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. I understand. I am just trying to get a definition of exclusive jurisdiction or clear jurisdiction. If this involves a question not only of the location and distribution and so on of weapons which include atomic energy but the question of whether it is proper or legal for atomic energy equipment and materials to go into those weapons which are scattered abroad, then we at least have jurisdiction insofar as the atomic energy matter is concerned. I think there is a broad gray area in there that overlaps and interlocks.

I think this Committee has clear jurisdiction on the question of whether atomic energy can be sent abroad. We have clear jurisdiction on determining whether other nations will have atomic weapons information; that is, as to atomic material. But if we have once abandoned that, then we have nothing to say about where the weapons are put. If we say, "Yes you can send atomic materials abroad, you can give information within some limits to other countries", then whether they are put on the top of a mountain or the bottom of the sea is beyond our jurisdiction.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. This is true unless we see something being done which nullifies that area of responsibility which is ours.



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SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. If there is a violationCHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Section 202 requires that
the Committee shall be kept fully and currently informed with
respect to the activities of the Commission and the Defense Department
with respect to the development, utilization or application of
atomic energy. The Department of Defense has not done that in
the case of the Jupiter weapons.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. It doesn't say "weapons".


It says "application of atomic energy".

SENATOR ANDERSON. Once they have told you they were going to apply atomic energy to make a certain type weapon that responsibility ceases.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. Once we approve the application and it is translated into a weapon with our approval of the application and that application may include information to nations abroad -

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. The bilateral takes care of that.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. Once that is done and it becomes a weapon -



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CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. They are coming to us with the Italian bilateral in recognition of this Committee's interest in weapons. They are seeking the approval of this committee -- and it becomes approval if we don't turn it down within 60 days -- for releasing certain classified information.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. That is our business -

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. That becomes our business and the fact that the weapons are in a position where this might be done involuntarily, by seizure or sabotage is also part of our responsibility it seems to me. There were three Jupiters setting there in the open -- all pointed toward to the sky -- down at a base in Southern Italy. Within a distance of less than here to the new House Office building there is a scrub forest land and a person from there with a 30/30 could put holes in the jackets of these three Jupiters and abort the complete mission of the base itself. Over \$300 million has been spent to set that little show up and it can be knocked out with 3 rifle bullets. Do you mean to tell me that is not a matter of concern to us? If it is not a matter of concern as far as atomic energy is involved, then it certainly is a matter of concern to me as an American representative in the Congress.

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SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. I thoroughly agree.

Do they have that authority? That is the question. Do they have the authority to place atomic materials in those warheads which are situated in Italy.? If they are there with proper authority, then once they are there in the custody of whomever they are in the custody of, then I think the arrangement and disposition of those weapons as weapons probably passes into the jurisdiction of another Committee although it is a matter of intense interest to us.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I agree to that, but I also think from the background of our knowledge of the subject if we see something being done and no one else is complaining about it.

I think our responsibility as members of the House and Senate -

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. I think we not only have the right, but we have a responsibility to give our suggestions.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. That is all we are doing. We are giving our suggestions as to how these things, which we think are wrong, can be cured.

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REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Did we not give authority to our government to turn over these weapons to NATO under U.S. control?

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. Yes. If they had turned over the practical custody, but with the two key theory this control technically is with our people -

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Did we not take into consideration the security angle when we granted this authority?

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. I think we did.

MR. RAMEY. Under different conditions.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Is it not true you are challenging the security -

SENATOR BENNETT. We are challenging the custody -

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. The custody -

SENATOR BENNETT. Custody and security both; two separate things.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. You can challenge the custody and security as it applies to atomic material. Once we have consented as to the security and custody of atomic materials, then



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it becomes a matter of -

REPRESENTATIVE BATES. On that point, who made that determination?

SENATOR GORE. Who consented?

REPRESENTATIVE BATES. This 202 talks about the utilization of atomic energy and in the definition of a weapon, it refers to the utilization of atomic energy. It seems to me they are one and the same or inseparable.

SENATOR ANDERSON. Turn it around.

SENATOR HICKENLDOPER. I wouldn't go that far.

REPRESENTATIVE BATES. Why not?

SENATOR ANDERSON. You are talking about the by-product and the by-product belongs to the Department of Defense.

REPRESENTATIVE BATES. It says, "any device utilizing atomic energy." That is the definition of atomic weapons. When it talks about atomic energy, it talks about the utilization of it.

SENATOR ANDERSON. Bill, I am only saying that

Section 202, which says "Authority and Duty -- the Joint Committee

shall make continuing studies of activities of the Atomic Energy Commission
and of problems relating to the development, use and control of

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atomic energy", and does not say "and use of weapons."

REPRESENTATIVE BATES. If you read further it refers to the Department of Defense and the utilization of atomic energy.

SENATOR ANDERSON. "The Department of Defense shall keep the Joint Committee fully informed with respect to all matters within the Department of Defense relating to the development, utilization, or application of atomic energy."

REPRESENTATIVE BATES. That is right.

SENATOR ANDERSON. When you put them over there that becomes a State Department decision.

REPRESENTATIVE BATES. I am not sure. The Department of Defense when they define an atomic weapon refer to it as being any device utilizing atomic energy. So it seems to me it is still tied together and it just doesn't disappear because you put a cover around it.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. We are now back to where we were when we were writing the bill, which has become law. We are discussing again a very controversial area. It involves weapons, submarines and nuclear powered submarines. I can

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remember Stub Cole sitting here and arguing this point.

SENATOR ANDERSON. Me too, but we lost the argument.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. You lost, but it doesn't mean you weren't right.

SENATOR PASTORE. Let's assume these weapons were assigned by the President of the United States to NATO to be used exclusively within the control and possession of the United States armed forces. Would we have any complaint?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. No.

SENATOR PASTORE. We are losing sight here of what the purpose is. The purpose here is to take these warheads and put them in full display. Once they are mounted, other nationals will be given information as to how they should be used. That is where you get into the field of security. In other words unless we approve this bilateral with Italy, we have not only wasted our time, but our money in the Southern part of Italy because we have to reorganize the whole program or pull these things. You have got to realize these missiles are exclusively within the possession now of other nationals. Technically the custody of the warheads is some place else -- on the other side of the fence. But it won't make a bit of difference when you once mount this warhead on the missile

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unless you instruct these nationals how to use them. That is
the purpose of it -- the purpose of having put them in the first
place is to allow other nationals to use them and to be there when
there are fired.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. You are not quite right -

SENATOR ANDERSON. If you assume Wednesday is

Saturday, I can prove the week is a short week but if the assumption is wrong -

SENATOR PASTORE. You tell me where I am wrong.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I will try to tell you, subject to correction by all the rest of my friends. In the first place the warheads are on the missiles so we have already passed that point. They are not somewhere else.

SENATOR PASTORE. The warheads are right on the missiles?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. On top of the missile. The next thing is in place of it being in the possession of the United States, there are 7 men and a portable trailer out there connected up electrically with the thing. Six of them are other nationals and one of them who has the key is an American.

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All they have to do is to hit him on the head with a blackjack and they have got his key.

SENATOR ANDERSON. And this is the difference between custody and possession. The law says "possession" and the Department of Defense has continuously used the word "custody", a word not found in the law. They interpret "custody" as being technical possession obtained by having one of these keys not recognizing that from a physical standpoint the key can be taken away from the American by jerking it off his neck and hitting him over the head with a club.

SENATOR PASTORE. But if the Attorney General decides that is in the custody of the American, they have fulfilled the provisions of the law.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. There hasn't been any decision.

The law doesn't say "custody". The law says, "possession".

SENATOR PASTORE. But if the Attorney General turns around and says it is still in the possession of the American forces?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. There has been no ruling. There has been complet subterfuge and evasion of the law.

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SENATOR PASTORE. The point here is not the squabble over possession and custody. The point here is, Why are they there?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. That is another point.

SENATOR PASTORE. They are there to teach other nationals how to use them.

EHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. That is another point. That is not the point -


SENATOR PASTORE. This base is under the control of the Italian nationals. This is an Italian base. This is not an American base.

SENATOR ANDERSON. It turned out to be. It was intended to be an American base -

SENATOR PASTORE. No. It is not intended. That is just the point.

MR. RAMEY. They explained to us the warhead was going to be kept separate from the missile. We would train the Italians in the use of these things and these things would be mated in the event of hostilities.

SENATOR PASTORE. That is what I was told.



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MR. RAMEY. They have established these Alert

Procedures that we learned about this summer whereby the

warhead is mated to the missile and is sitting up there already


to go.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. You know what the situation was on Genie. The Genie was fastened under the plane; a plane which was going into the air in the complete control of another national -- complete custody, possession and everything else. We took a strong position on that and they cancelled that part of it.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. We are confusing maybe custody in practice and theory. In theory with the key we have custody and practically you can bat a man over the head or hit with him an ax handle -

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I am not confused. It is very clear to me what happened.

SENATOR ANDERSON. That is why I wanted to have a little time so as to be sure we were together on what we are going to talk to him about.



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REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. When we were writing the law, as I recall it, we discussed the placing of nuclear warheads under U.S. control in regional organizations that involved a group of nations. We also wrote into the bill, which is now law, security requirements and we extracted from the Department of Defense, did we not a guarantee --

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. The President had to certify REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. The President had to certify
that the security of these nations involved in this regional organization
met the requirements of the law. Is not the situation now that an
Ad Hoc Committee of the Joint Committee is challenging the
security -

MR. CONWAY. No sir.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Of one of the countries of a regional organization as far as the security of a nuclear warhead is concerned.

CHAIRMAN HOLIEIELD. That is right.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. Mr. Chairman, I certainly say we do challenge the security of these Jupiters in Italy. I wish you could have seen it.

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There was this brush around there. Of course they say there wouldn't be a rifle within ten miles of the place. However, we found out -- and this is a surprise to a lot of people -- that with a \$1.75 rifle you could hit that thing -- and it would be pretty hard to miss it -- at the time they are fueling which is about a 20 minute period and obliterate that weapon.

I think the Commttee would be remiss in its duties if it did not bring this to the attention of people who I am sure do not realize that has been done. As Senator Pastore has said it is a fait accompli in Italy. It is there. You can improve the situation but they are there. They are not in Turkey. Only the locations have been spotted and the money hasn't been spent to put them there.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Maybe we can prevent another mistake.

REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. It was the unanimous opinion of the members on the trip that the Polaris in a mobile type of base would be much better and undoubtedly a lot cheaper. Again we would be remiss if we didn't call that to the attention of the proper people. Somebody ought to do it.

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SENATOR PASTORE. Let me say this. To tell the truth

I think the only interest Italy had in agreeing to this was because
it meant a certain number of jobs to build the darn base. Now that
it is built, they would just as soon have you take them out.

We gave them a bill of goods that we were going to spend \$15 million
or \$20 million. Now we have spent it. Now they are up there and they
would rather have the out of there.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. There is a question in my mind as to who has the responsibility now. Is it the Department of Defense or is it State Department?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. State Department. They send the bilateral up here that -

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. No. Let's forget the bilateral for now. We are talking about NATO. Italy is a member of NATO and under authority granted to NATO these weapons are in Italy. Now comes the question - Who has the responsibility of security?

SENATOR GORE. The President.


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REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. To whom does he delegate it: State Department or the Department of Defense?

SENATOR PASTORE. To Norstad.

to Mr. Van Zandt's statement about the procedures required of the President in making certain findings and security procedures before they can enter into these agreements. A point this Committee may want to watch is that under their interpretation today they can enter into an agreement for the Polaris missile system and not have any kind of agreement and not have these detailed security findings because their position is they don't need an agreement for cooperation for these missiles; that they can do it without giving them Restricted Data.

It is the same thing with the placing of weapons about their planes, at least that portion of placing them there. We discussed with the Defense Department the Genie, the MB-1 and the fact that they did not have an agreement for cooperation. I asked them then if it was their interpretation they could do this with any nation



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notwithstanding they had no agreement for cooperation and they said, "Yes, because no Restricted Data would be passed."

The point I would like to make is this. You find yourself in a position where very detailed findings must be made by the President, by the State Department, the AEC and DoD and very detailed assurances must be given for relatively unimportant and less sensitive type of information under 144 b but you can place a weapon on their ship, for example, and they don't necessarily have to be a member of the NATO organization. You could presumably do it with Israel, with Spain or any other country because they claim this is not under the provisions of an agreement for cooperation. You find yourself in a position, I think, where they can go much further the way they interpret the law than they can under these agreements for cooperation.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Let me ask you another question. I have not read this report. Did you get into England?

SENATOR BENNETT. Yes.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. West Germany? CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Yes.

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REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Did you find the same conditions existing in those countries?

SENATOR PASTORE. Not quite the same; almost as bad.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. In Turkey there have been two military coups in the last ten months. They are favorable to us and they hate the Russians. There is no doubt in my mind, but what we have stout supporters in Turkey, but this does not establish the stability of their government nor does it establish the technological capability to handle these things. It doesn't establish the economics of it to have another fifteen of these Jupiters spread around among the mountains of Turkey subject to the same kind of sabotage although I would say there is a lesser chance there than in Italy because there is not the Communist infiltration in Turkey that there is in Italy.

The suggestion is made in this report that possibly a

Polaris submarine with 16 missiles on it, cruising in the Mediterranean,

evasive and mobile in its base, would be a lot cheaper and a lot

better and be in the control of the United States than to put these

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obsolete Jupiters -- and you can't expect 50 percent of them
to go off when they are fired anyway -- in these expensive places
back in the mountains where the logistics of supply are something
terrible and your problem of evacuation or destruction in case of
an overrun of the country is complicated. There are so many things.
This report goes into quite a number of these.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. You are talking about

Jupiters that have nuclear capabilities. Do we not have other weapons
in Europe that have nuclear capabilities?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Sure.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Doesn't the Matador have nuclear capabilities?

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. The Honest John -

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. If you go into West Germany you will see them sitting out in the cornfields. Sixty percent of all our weapons in Europe are in Germany.

CHARMAN HOLIFIELD. When we take the Honest John from Geissen where it is under guard and take it up the road 100 miles, do you know who takes it? It is not the United States. They it turn/over to the Germans to take it up there.

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REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Doesn't this bring us back to this problem? I think I mentioned this the first time we had a subcommittee meeting on this. Shouldn't we challenge the overall security that is being applied to the handling of nuclear weapons abroad. It is not only the Jupiter. It applies to the Matador and others.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. That is right.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. I think it is the responsibility of the Department of Defense to come up here and tell us why these security regulations are ineffective. I do not think they are effective.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. You have the appropriateness of weapons which is dealt with in this report. In other words, why give to the Turks for instance the most complicated and what are now becoming rapidly obsolete weapons. If you are going to give them something, why not have it be something that is not as complicated as this tremendous thing that they. Then there is the Corporal. You have this oncoming solid fuel group of missiles

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
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which are movable and which are simple to operate. Along with that simplicity of operation goes an added concern as to their quick capture and use by the other side. You solve one problem and you get another.

SENATOR ANDERSON. You have to let them have Corporals because when they brought out the Sergeant, which was a solid fuel version of the Corporal, there was a suggestion made that they merely substitute solid fuel and the manufacturer said if he had to substitute fuel, he had to build a whole new weapon.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. If you read this report, I think you will find there has been some good thinking in it. I believe it is something that can be constructive if the people who are concerned with these policies want to read it. If they don't, of course they won't. That is all.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, let me clarify my position. I am not objecting at all to giving our judgment because we are vitally interested and there is an interlocking in the utility and location of these weapons in which atomic energy is used. I am




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not saying we ought to pin ourselves right down to the minimum line here. The only thing I think the discussion has done for us is to clarify the issues as to what they are.

I am not suggesting we do not give a few gratuitous bits of advice here which I think this investigation may make worth while.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. We recognize some of it is gratuitous and the way it is set forth is just to protect ourselves against that criticism.



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SENATOR ANDERSON. I think a very useful purpose has been served. I am glad the Committee made its study. I think from the standpoint of the overall welfare of the United States it is a most valuable document even though I haven't read it thoroughly. I do believe if the Chairman of the Committee will carry this to the President and discuss it with him -- if possible maybe send a few members of the Committee to meet with Secretary McNammara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk that a very useful result could come from this. I am merely trying to avoid getting ourselves in a position where we try to assume jurisdiction over a custody of these weapons which we may not have. But if we do have overall responsibility to see a good job is done in providing custody for them I think if the Committee will go ahead with that, it will have done all it probably can do in the immediate future.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. Some years ago I had a stretch of active duty in Europe. I was working out of NATO. I went up into West Germany and saw these missiles: the Honest John and the Matador. They had a nuclear warhead on the Matador but not on the Honest John. They were in an igloo nearby. I was really

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amazed to see their accessibility to the farmers working in nearby fields.

That night at dinner when we had the brass with us, I brought up the subject and said I was concerned as a member of this Committee. They informed me that the cost of defending the weapon was such that they just couldn't think of it. They had to accept this security violation and had to live with it. Of course I came back and made a report to the House Armed Services Committee and talked to Vincent about it. Of course he said, "Well the military will take care of it." We are right back today where we were at that time.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. Shall we find out when to have the witnesses on the Italian bilateral? That seems to be the most pressing. This can wait. There is no action required on this -- except the action of each individual to familiarize himself with it. The action of referring it to the President and responsible people has been taken by the Subcommittee and I hope properly so in view of the time pressure it was under.

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REPRESENTATIVE WESTLAND. You said, "no action".

Isn't it your intention to have the DoD or State Department up to discuss this?

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CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. No action immediately. What I mean is that we want to take care of first things first and we have two or three tomorrow morning and afternoon and Thursday.

SENATOR ANDERSON. Are we going to have somebody on our staff prepare a statement with reference to this Italian agreement or are we just going to have a group come up?

I am not very happy with the Italian agreement. I think we ought to see to it that staff or somebody prepares some questions so that we do develop what the hazards are in the Italian agreement if there are hazards.

MR. RAMEY. This report brings up some of the substantive problems and staff would be glad to prepare some questions.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I think that should be done. The reason I haven't gotten into this Italian thing is because Senator Pastore has been Chairman of the subcommittee that considers those bilaterals. I don't know whether he wants to continue as Chairman of that subcommittee or not. I thought I would confer with him and clear it with him because I don't want to step on anybody's toes. I don't mind kicking somebody but I hate to step on their toes because they can always kick back and they can't when you are standing on their toes.

(Laughter)

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I thought I would clear with him as to the timing of the Italian thing and I think it ought to be done as soon as possible.

SENATOR ANDERSON. We only have thirty days. It ought to be done as soon as possible. I don't know why it isn't proper to address an inquiry to the State Department and ask them when they thing the days began to run.

REPRESENTATIVE PRICE. Chet, there is only one side to the Irish question? Can we just consider the Irish agreement and give our blessing to it? You know there are never two sides to an Irish question.

(Laughter)

REPRESENTATIVE BATES. Just the wrong side.

(Laughter)

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. I have another matter I would like to bring up, Mr. Chairman whenever you have finished. This is not necessarily a matter that ought to come up today or tomorrow.

These discussions with the Russians on tests are going to begin in March as I understand it.

SENATOR ANDERSON. Within about three weeks.

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REPRESENTATIVE HOSMER. The 21st of March.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. In March some time. I have my own definite upinions up to this moment on the question of resumptions of tests and the reasons for it. I think this is a very proper field for this Committee to consider seriously as to whether we want to at least off the record or privately take it up with any of those in authority. I think it is a pretty serious thing. I think we have gone just about as far as we can without coming to some final decision.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. You will see we have it on this tentative list -

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. I am sorry.

SENATOR ANDERSON. I think it is very proper that

Senator Hickenlooper brings it up. I was shocked to read in the

newspapers that Mr. McCloy had the responsibility both for the

disarmament and resumption of nuclear testing. I took it upon

myself to telephone Mr. McCloy. He came down. He was here and

he came over to see me. I asked him if he didn't intend to try

to find out what the Committee thought about this thing. My guess
is he does not.

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SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. He will say that he already has the opinion of one member of the Joint Committee very definitely.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. One of the things I wanted to bring up was that I have talked to Mr. McCloy too. It was the first time I had met the man and I had the feeling that he was a very confused individual as anyone would be who was thrown into this thing all of a sudden.

However, if we could do this unanimously I think it would be very proper for us to let the President know what the Committee thinks about the resumption of tests. As far as I am concerned I am perfectly willing to go on the record that I thought the position taken by the Commission in their annual report was really refreshing and that they had the courage to come out and take a position against this test moratorium being continued indefinitely. I think the Pæsident-- whether he would welcome it or not -- should welcome the composite opinion of this Committee. If we can arrive at a type of letter or communication to him -- whether we do it publicly or not is a matter for us to decide -- but at least privately I think it would probably help to shore him up a little bit for us to give him

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our judgment on the matter.

REPRESENTATIVE HOSMER. I took an occasion last week to send a letter down to the White House because these things are coming up the 21st of March. He has this group working on it.

They are doing it apparently without any enlightenment even from this Committee. I simply recommended the end of the moratorium because the Russians are getting what they want; namely, no testing by us with no control on them. They are getting along fine.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. On a technical point I think maybe they can take the position that the matter of a test ban is primarily a political decision. I say, primarily. But by the same token we are charged with the responsibility from a legislative standpoint for the development and perfection and so on of atomic materials and their utility. I have hesitated to make a unilateral declaration or statement on the subject. I am perfectly willing to do so. There is no hesitancy on my part as to willingness, but I would simply like to see whether there is unanimity on the part of this Committee. I think if there is unanimity on the part of this Committee, it would be a very powerful and important factor. How

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much basic effect it would actually have, I don't know.

I am normally against this Committee giving too much advice. I always have been, but this is an occasion which I think is sufficiently important. In this field I think we should seriously consider the question of whether or not we want to take a definite position on the question of the test moratorium. I am willing to do it. I think we ought to talk about it.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. May I ask you just one question?

We have this set up for an Executive Session. Do you think we ought
to do it prior to that hearing or after?

SENATOR ANDERSON. Before you put that question, may I make a suggestion?

You are going down to see the President tomorrow. If it would be in order I would move the Chairman of this Committee be specifically requested to suggest to the President that the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy would be pleased to discuss with Mr. McCloy and such other persons as he may desire, including the President himself if he should desire to be here, our viewpoint on the resumption of a nuclear test ban. I am in complete agreement

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with what Mr. Hosmer has said -- or virtually so. I think from what I heard that Senator Hickenlooper suggested about the same thing to Mr. McCloy as I suggested to him. I think there is a possibility we are all pretty much in agreement. I think if Mr. McCloy knew this responsible legislative committee was somewhat unanimous in its point of view, it might help him in his work when he went to the resumption of nuclear testing conference.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. About a month or so ago a friend of mind who had been asked to serve on this group came and talked to me. He indicated he was most anxious to talk to me so I got to him as quickly as I could. I was amazed when he told me that McCloy and his associates had indicated they did not want any of the thinking of the old group and especially the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. I would have to have that first hand.

REPRESENTATIVE VAN ZANDT. I was literally amazed.

I asked him, Why the Joint Committee? He said it is because you people have expressed yourselves, and we have the facts.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. We haven't expressed ourselves.

The only thing I would say to contravene the impression which this

fellow gave you would be the fact that Mr. McCloy came to see

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Senator Anderson and he came to see me. He was soliciting views.

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. He came to see me. I gave him my views although I said of course I could not speak for the Joint Committee. I didn't go that far. I said I don't know how they all feel, but that I thought there were a substantial number who were pretty well in accord with what I had said along this line. I said, "I think a lot of us are in substantial agreement on this point, but we have had no formal determination on the point. These are my views on it."

SENATOR ANDERSON. Doesn't the motion I made sort of cover this thing? If McCloy doesn't want to meet with us, all he has to do is to say, "I don't want to meet with you."

CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. From a parliamentary point of view, was that in the form of a motion?

SENATOR ANDERSON. I did move that when you visit the President you extend the suggestion the Joint Committee would be glad to meet with Mr. McCloy and such other persons as he desired to bring with him to consider the position of the United States in the forthcoming resumption of the Conference on Nuclear Testing.

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CHAIRMAN HOLIFIELD. If there is no objection I will explore that matter with him and report back to the Committee-providing he gives me enough time. I don't know what he wants to talk to me about.

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. With all due respect to the President's subordinates and administrators I would suggest you call his personal attention to this report -- and I expect you will -- and tell him you think it is important and I think it is important. I know he has other things to read. I have found out in the past that sometimes things you thought would go through to the President' didn't get through to the President.

SENATOR ANDERSON. You ought to take a copy with you.

I think he ought to read this report.

REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD. I thought I would take

John with me and he could have the document in his custody. I

am also taking Jim Ramey with me although I am not taking them

in to the President because they are not invited but I would have them

standing by from the standpoint of custody and any questions if he

should want to talk about the atomic energy program. I will be

prepared to discuss the budget with him as it has been submitted

to us. If he wants to talk on that subject there are two things I

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am anxious to bring up. One is what is the present Administration's attitude on this Stanford linear accelerator. I don't know if they are going to back it or not. The previous Administration for it.

We spent -- or we authorized \$3 million for a study to be made of it. I want to know what the situation is going to be. They have recommended a budget of \$123 million. It doesn't have that in it. It has that in the supplemental. There has been a supplemental recommendation I guess. Did that come from the previous Administration or this Administration?

MR. RAMEY. From the past Administration.

REPRESENTATIVE HOLIFIELD. How about the Stanford accelerator?

SENATOR HICKENLOOPER. It might help if you offered to move it to Harvard.

(Laughter)

SENATOR ANDERSON. I was going to say, Chet, I think you will find out that the Administration is taking a look to see if the cost figures are somewhat near right. There has been an estimate that the cost figure may run \$275 million before you get through. That might change the attitude. I don't know where that figure came from. I was asked if I knew anything about it.